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ARTICLES
GENDER EQUITY IN INTERSCHOLASTIC
SPORTS: THE FINAL SAGA:




This article is the third installment in a series of articles that examine gender
equity in sports at the interscholastic level. The initial article1 detailed the progress
of a case filed as a class action against Owasso Public Schools on behalf of female
students. The second article2 focused on the Consent Decree which culminated the
case and set out the changes that Owasso Public Schools agreed to make. This article
details the procedures involved in settling the dispute over the costs and attorneys'
fees related to the case.
The final provision of the Consent Decree stated that the Owasso School
District would pay Ray Yasser and Sam Schiller the reasonable costs and attorneys
fees' incurred in connection with the lawsuit.3 The amount of the payment, based on
the reasonableness of the costs and fees, is determined either by the court or by
t. Ray Yasser is a Professor of Law at the University of Tulsa College of Law. He has published extensively in
the field of sports law, and is coauthor of the nation's most widely used sports law textbook.
it. Sam Schiller is a University of Tulsa College of Law graduate and maintains a general law practice in Haskell,
Oklahoma. We, the authors, would like to extend our appreciation to our very able research assistant, Amy Jolley.
Without her assistance, this article would not have been completed on time, and the footnotes would have lacked all
semblance of proper form.
1. See Ray Yasser& Samuel J. Schiller, Gender Equity in Athletics: The New Battleground oflnterscholastic
Sports, 15 CARDozoARTS &ENT. 1.371 (1997).
2. See Ray Yasser& Samuel J. Schiller, GenderEquity in Interscholastic Sports: A Case Study, 33 TUI.SALJ.
273 (1997).
3. See Consent Decree at 18, Randolph v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. (N.D. Okla. 1996) (No. 96-CV-0105-K).
1
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agreement of the parties.4 Since the parties were unable to agree on the costs and
attorneys' fees, the court order finalized the issue.' This article focuses on the dispute
over the calculation of the fees and the reasonableness of the costs incurred.
While it may seem a bit "pedestrian" to devote an entire article to what we have
dubbed a "fee fight," as a practical matter the fee struggle looms large. Indeed, if the
practicing attorney is to take these cases, she must have some reasonable assurance
of payment. We believe that simply relying on the pro bono efforts of public-spirited
lawyers will not get the job done. This belief provides the impetus for this
installment. Lawyers who are confident they can take these cases, win them, and get
fairly compensated are essential to the ultimate success in this battle. A few brief
observations about the general rules in connection to these fee disputes are in order.
In its discretion, the court is permitted to award costs and attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party in a Title- IX6 action.7  Plaintiffs' counsel has the burden of
establishing the reasonableness of fees. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that this
involves submitting evidence "supporting the hours worked and rates claimed."8
Counsel must show the reasonableness of both the number of hours expended and the
hourly rate sought to be recovered.9 The burden then shifts to the party opposing the
fee to demonstrate that the fee is not reasonable.'"
The following discussion covers the entire dispute over the costs and attorneys'
fees, beginning with our initial arguments. A discussion of defendants' opposing
arguments follows, countered by our response to defendants' arguments. The article
concludes with a summary of the Court Order, with comments on the final calculation
of the costs and fees.
I. OUR INITIAL ARGUMENTS
The first step in determining the appropriate fee in a civil rights case such as
this Title IX action is to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by the
customary hourly rate." This calculation is known as the lodestar and is the basic
standard for assessment of attorneys' fees.' 2 The minimum award using the lodestar
standard should not be less than the number of hours claimed times the attorneys'
regular hourly rate." "Once counsel has carried its burden of proof on the 'basic
standard' a strong presumption arises that the product represents a reasonable fee." 4
4. See generally, Consent Decree, Randoif(No. CV-0105-K).
5. See Consent Decree, supra note 3.
6. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1998).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1998).
8. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
9. See Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942,955 (10th Cir. 1994).
10. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990).
11. See Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546,552 (10th Cir. 1983).
12. SeeJane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1509 (10th Cir. 1995); Mares v. Credit Bureau, 801 F.2d 1197, 1201
(I0th Cir. 1986).
13. See Zoll v. Eastern Allamakee Community Sch. Dist., 588 F.2d 246,252 (8th Cir. 1978).
14. Mares, 801 F.2dat 1201.
[Vol. 34.85
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THE FIGHT FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES
The "basic standard" for calculating reasonable fees consists of reasonable hours and
reasonable rates.'"
The lodestar figures calculated for the plaintiffs' attorneys were submitted to
the district court in affidavits as follows:
Attorney Hours Rate Total Lodestar
Ray Yasser 132.00 $175.00 $23,100.0016
Samuel Schiller 160.25 $125.00 $20,031.2517
Judith Appelbaum 3.00 $175.00 $525.00"8
Deborah Brake 4.00 $125.00 $500.0019
Total $44,156.25
The affidavits were accompanied by "Billing Records" that detailed the nature of the
professional services rendered as well as the time spent on those services.20 The
hours involved were reasonably expended based on the tasks necessary to bring the
Owasso School District into compliance with Title IX requirements. We argued that
our hourly rates were reasonable based on all relevant circumstances, including the
attorneys' credentials, to which we referred in support of our Motion for Class
Action Certification.2
The lodestar calculation is the first step in determining attorneys' fees.22 Once
the initial calculation is made, the lodestar may be adjusted upward if factors not
included in the reasonable fee analysis warrant such an adjustment. 3  This is
commonly referred to as an enhancement.24 Thus, the court undertakes a two-step
analysis. First, the court objectively determines the reasonable value of the lodestar.'
The strong presumption exists that this amount represents a reasonable fee.26 In the
second step, the court decides whether to adjust the lodestar amount to take certain
special factors into account.27 In the Owasso case, we argued that the special factors
involved warranted a discretionary upward adjustment of the lodestar figure. While
15. Id.
16. See Ray YasserAffidavit at 1, Randolph v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. (N.D. Okla. 1996) (No. 96-CV-0105-K);
see also Ray Yasser Billing Records at 15, Randolph v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. (N.D. Okla. 1996) (No. 96-CV-
0105-K).
17. See Samuel SchillerAffidavit at 1, Randolph v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. (N.D. Okla. 1996) (No. 96-CV-0105-
K); see also Samuel Schiller Billing Records at 18, Randolph v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. (N.D. Okla. 1996) (No. 96-
CV-0105-K).
18. See Judith Appelbaum Affidavit at 1-3, Randolph v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. (N.D. Okla. 1996) (No. 96-CV-
0105-K).
19. See Deborah Brake Affidavit at 1-3, Randolph v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. (N.D. Okla. 1996) (No. 96-CV-
0105-K).
20. See Yasser Billing Records, supra note 16, at 1-15; Schiller Billing Records, supra note 17, at 1-18;
Appelbaum Affidavit, supra note 18, at 1-3; Brake Affidavit, supra note 19, at 1-3.
21. See Brief in Support of Motion for Class Action Certification, Randolfv. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. (N.D. Okla
1996) (No. 96-CV-0105-K).
22. See generally Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
23. See Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 557 (10th Cir. 1983).
24. See, e.g., Ramos at 557.
25. See Mares v. Credit Bureau, 801 F.2d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 1986).
26. Id.
27. See Ramos, 713 F.2d at 557.
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we anticipated that we might not receive an enhancement, we believed it was
reasonable to argue for such an adjustment. The courts have set out the following
factors as appropriate in considering an enhancement:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) novelty and difficulty of question presented;
(3) the skill required to perform the legal services; (4) the preclusion of other
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee
in the community; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations
imposed by client or circumstances; (8) the amount involved and results obtained;
(9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability
of the cases; (11) the nature and length of professional relationship with the client;
(12) awards in similar cases.'
We contended that the novel, groundbreaking issues addressed in the Owasso
case, together with the way in which they were handled, provided a persuasive
argument in favor of an enhancement. The case was the first Title IX cause of action
brought at the interscholastic level in Oklahoma, and one of few filed nationwide.
Viewed objectively, the skills and efforts involved and the results obtained met many
of the factors outlined above as appropriate for an upward adjustment.
The case was unpopular when we first agreed to handle it. After the case was
filed, the local Owasso newspaper chastised the plaintiffs in its lead editorial for
doing a disservice to the community. Individual plaintiffs had legitimate fears of
retribution. These facts attested to the undesirability of the case.
To provide appropriate legal services, we had to both fully understand the law
and spend considerable time researching all aspects of Owasso's programs. This
involved obtaining information not only from the named plaintiffs, but also from other
class members and in many instances, others who had an interest in the administration
of Owasso's sports programs. In addition, the commitments required precluded
other employment. Payment was entirely contingent on prevailing. We did not
charge the class members any fees, and did not collect any attorneys' fees from any
other source.
Title IX, and the accompanying Regulations and Policy Interpretations,29
presented a difficult and complex mosaic of issues as they applied to interscholastic
and other school sponsored sports. Many of the issues were of first impression, again
attesting to the novelty of the case. We successfully brought the application of Title
IX into the intramural context of both intermediate and high schools, setting a
precedent not only for Owasso, but also for the rest of the state and the entire nation.
The matter was prosecuted efficiently as well as effectively. The case was filed
28. Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598, 601 n.3 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 839 (1980) (citing
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d714,717 (5thCir. 1974)); see also King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024,
1026-27 (IstCir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S.916 (1978); Uzzell v. Friday,618 F. Supp. 1222,1224-25 (D.C. N.C.
1985); Coleman v. Block,589 F. Supp. 1411,1415 (D.C.N.D. 1984); Stacy v. Stroud, 845 F. Supp. 1135, 1138 (S.D.
W. Va. 1993).
29. 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (1996).
[Vol. 34:85
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on February 15, 1996, and the Consent Decree was signed on October 2, 1996.30
This was an example of the system working well, with justice dispensed both fairly
and swiftly. In the interests of conserving the resources of both the court and of the
defendants regarding their ultimate liability for attorneys' fees, we agreed early in the
process to approach the case in the spirit of cooperation. This approach drastically
reduced the potential amount of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, resulting in a lodestar
figure surprisingly low considering the far-reaching accomplishments realized in the
case.
Finally, the Consent Decree clearly demonstrated that the lawsuit accomplished
exactly what the originally named plaintiffs intended-to bring Owasso into full
compliance with Title IX, the Regulations, and the Policy Interpretations.3 The
excellent results obtained, along with the other factors to consider in adjusting the
lodestar, made a compelling argument for a discretionary enhancement of the lodestar
calculation.
The Owasso case was the first to extend the Title IX mandate into the middle
school level. In addition, the Consent Decree has already served as a model Title IX
compliance plan. Widely reported in the newspapers, the Consent Decree proved
effective outside the Owasso School District. Other school districts voluntarily began
moving into compliance as a direct result of the litigation. In fact, defendant Dale
Johnson, Owasso Schools Superintendent, reported that twenty-five to thirty other
superintendents had contacted him for tips on how to get their districts into
compliance with Title IX.
In addition to the lodestar and its potential enhancement, out-of-pocket expenses
incurred during litigation should be included in fee allowances in civil rights cases if
they are reasonable in amount and are normally itemized and billed in addition to the
hourly rate.32 The out-of-pocket expenses included in billing records for Samuel
Schiller were normally itemized and billed to the client in addition to the hourly
attorney rate.33 This was verified in an affidavit submitted by the managing partner
of Mr. Schiller's law firm.34 The only expense included with Mr. Yasser's billing
records was for mileage, which was reasonable in amount and clearly incurred as a
part of the litigation.35
The Consent Decree contemplated that the court and the attorneys would
continue their involvement with the full implementation of the Decree.36 The
plaintiffs believed that it was reasonably foreseeable that the attorneys for the Class
would continue to play a role in the process of compliance and therefore we requested
that the court exercise its broad discretion to fashion the award in such a way as to
30. Consent Decree, supra note 3.
31. 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (1996).
32. See Mares v. Credit Bureau, 801 F.2d 1197, 1208 (10th Cir. 1986); Ramos, 713 F.2d at 559.
33. See Schiller Billing Records, supra note 17, at 1-18.
34. See David Nichols Affidavit at 1-2, Randolph v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. (N.D. Okla. 1996) (No. 96-CV-
0105-K).
35. See Yasser Billing Records, supra note 16, at 1-15.
36. See Consent Decree, supra note 3, at 17-18.
1998] 89
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permit the attorneys to seek and secure compensation for such monitoring services in
a timely and efficient manner.
Any award of fees is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court, and the
award should take into account all relevant factors presented by the particular case.3"
While the parties had general discussions on the subject of fees, the discussions
resulted only in an agreement on the part of the Owasso School District to pay
reasonable fees. Defendants had not yet articulated any specific objection to
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.
III. DEFENDANTS' OPPOSING ARGUMENTS
Counsel for the defendants opposed virtually all components of the attorneys'
fees requested by the plaintiffs. The defendants stressed that they did not dispute the
plaintiffs were entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees; however, the defendants
emphatically disputed the fees requested. The three main areas of contention were the
calculation of the lodestar,38 the request for a fee enhancement39 and future costs
related to monitoring the implementation of the Consent Decree.4" The defendants
alleged that the lodestar calculation incorrectly included (1) extensive duplication of
time by multiple attorneys,4' (2) recovery for time spent on public relations
activities,42 and (3) an excessive rate for Mr. Yasser and Ms. Appelbaum.4 3
The defendants argued, "'the most useful starting point for determining the
amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.' 4 This calculation provides an
objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's
services."45 The defendants stated that after the initial estimate was made, the court
should determine whether the fees should be adjusted either upward or downward.46
Thus, the defendants agreed on the basic methodology used to calculate the lodestar.
Their objections centered around the components of the calculation.
The defendants pointed to "massive" duplication of time by the two lead
attorneys as the most significant problem in the lodestar calculation.47 They began
by emphasizing that the "plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing the reasonableness
of 'each dollar, each hour, above zero."' 48 The defendants stressed for the exclusion
37. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,439 F. Supp. 393, 402 (D.C. Colo. 1977).
38. See Brief of the Owasso School District in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Awarding of Attorneys' Fees
at 3-11, Randolph v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. (N.D. Okla. 1996) (96-CV-0105-K) [hereinafter Defendants' Brief].
39. See id. at 11-15.
40. See id. at 15-16.
41. See id. at5-10.
42. See id. at 4-5.
43. Seeid. at lO-ll.
44. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 3 (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546,552 (10th Cir. 1983), quoting
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,433 (1983)).
45. Id. (quotingHensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (1983)).
46. See id. at3 (referencing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).
47. See id. at 5.
48. Id. at 6 (quoting Mares v. Credit Bureau, 801 F.2d 1197, 1210 (10th Cir. 1986)).
[Vol. 34.85
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of hours from the initial fee calculation that were not "reasonably expended."49
Hours potentially questioned may relate to overstaff'mg or may be "'excessive,
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary."' 50 The defendants indicated that the court has
the authority to reduce the plaintiffs' award in those instances where the necessity of
the hours is not adequately supported."
The defendants argued that in the Tenth Circuit, duplication is a factor when
determining reasonableness of attorneys' fees.52 The defendants noted that the court
in Ramos v. Lamm53 stated that just because time was actually spent on a case does
not mean that the time was actually reasonable:
Another factor the court should examine in determining the reasonableness of
hours expended is the potential duplication of services. For example, [if] three
attorneys are present at a hearing when one would suffice, compensation should
be denied for the excess time... [s]imilarly, if the same task is performed by more
than one lawyer, multiple compensation should be denied. The more lawyers
representing a side of the litigation, the greater the likelihood will be for
duplication of services.'
The defendants finished their litany on reasonableness by giving two examples
in which the court reduced attorneys' fees due to duplication.55 In the first, a district
court disallowed 100% of the time worked by a second attorney brought into the case
before the trial.5 6 The Tenth Circuit affirmed.57 The Circuit explained that "[t]here
is a difference between assistance of co-counsel which is merely comforting or helpful
and that which is essential to proper representation." '58 In the second example, the
district court's action, dividing in half the time requested by each of plaintiffs' two
attorneys for consultations with one another and with other attorneys uninvolved in
the case, was affirmed.59 The Tenth Circuit noted that cutting the fees in half due to
duplication of services was reasonable.6"
The defendants then began to list areas in which they felt time and efforts of the
plaintiffs' attorneys were duplicative.6' In total, the defendants indicated that 79.5
hours billed by Samuel Schiller and 75.75 hours billed by Ray Yasser mirrored each
other and were thus duplicative.62
49. Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).
50. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 6 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).
51. See id. (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433).
52. See id. (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546,554 (10th Cir. 1983)).
53. 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983).
54. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 6 (quoting Ramos, 713 F.2d at 554).
55. See id. at 6-7.
56. See id. at 6 (referencing Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1986)).
57. See id. at 6 (referencing Mares, 801 F.2d 1197).
58. Id. (quoting Mares, 801 F.2d at 1206).
59. See id. at 7 (referencing Mann v. Reynolds, 46 F.3d 1055, 1063 (10th Cir. 1995)).
60. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 7 (referencing Mann, 46 F.3d at 1063).
61. See id.
62. See id.; see also YasserBilling Records, supra note 16, at 1-15; Schiller Billing Records, supra note 17, at 1-
18.
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First, defendants stated that Mr. Schiller sought compensation for "32.25 hours
for 'personal conferences' with Mr. Yasser, the plaintiffs, and opposing counsel. 63
Defendants indicated that Mr. Yasser sought compensation for 28.75 hours for
"attending identical conferences." '64 Defendants indicated that both Mr. Schiller and
Mr. Yasser sought compensation for "1 hour for attending the case management
conference on June 12, [1996,] 1.5 hours for attending the status conference on
August 13, [1996,] and 5.25 hours for attending the settlement conference on
September 3, [1996].,,65 The defendants also noted that Mr. Schiller and Mr. Yasser
each sought compensation for "18.75 hours of telephone conferences in which the
other participated. ',66
In addition to labeling these efforts as duplicative, the defendants questioned the
overall necessity of various conferences based on the descriptions in the billing
statements. The defendants argued that in the "vast majority" of the personal and
telephone conferences,' "litigation strategy and legal analysis were the terms used
to describe the work performed by Messrs. Schiller and Yasser.69 The defendants
questioned this description, citing a need for the "specific issue or issues discussed"
and an explanation of the "need for.., extensive and continual consultation."7 The
defendants also indicated that they wanted an explanation for why it was "necessary
for both Mr. Schiller and Mr. Yasser to attend the case management conference, the
status conference, and the settlement conference."'"
The second issue regarding duplication dealt with the drafting and reviewing of
the Complaint filed in the action against the Owasso School District.72 The
defendants stated, "Mr. Schiller spent 12.25 hours drafting and reviewing the
complaint,"73 while "Mr. Yasser spent 12 hours drafting the same complaint."'74 The
defendants were disturbed by the lack of explanation as to why both spent nearly the
same amount of time drafting the complaint. 75 The defendants questioned the
attorneys' efficiency, stating that it might have worked better if one drafted the
complaint and the other reviewed and revised the complaint.76
63. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 7; see also Yasser Billing Records, supra note 16, at 1-15; Schiller Billing
Records, supra note 17, at 1-18.
64. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at7; see also Yasser Billing Records, supra note 16, at 1-15; Schiller Billing
Records, supra note 17, at 1-18.
65. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 7; see also Yasser Billing Records, supra note 16, at 10-11, 13; Schiller
Billing Records, supra note 17, at 9, 13, 15.
66. Defendants' Briefsupra note 38, at 7; see also Yasser Billing Recordssupra note 16, at 1- 15; Schiller Billing
Records, supra note 17, at 1-18.






73. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 7; see also Schiller Billing Records, supra note 17, at 1-3.
74. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 7; see also Yasser Billing Records, supra note 16, at 1, 3.
75. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 7.
76. See id. at 8.
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The third issue of potential duplication related to legal research.77 Mr. Schiller
and Mr. Yasser spent 4.5 and 2.25 hours on legal research respectively." The
defendants again questioned the plaintiffs' billing descriptions, which they described
as inadequate to determine whether the research hours were duplicative.7 9 The
defendants questioned the inclusion of these hours in the lodestar calculation without
reference to a specific motion or issue. 0
The defendants questioned the inclusion of Ms. Appelbaum's and Ms. Brake's
hours based not only on duplication but also on necessity."1 The defendants claimed
these hours should be excluded because Ms. Appelbaum and Ms. Brake "never
entered an appearance 82 in the case and were "not the plaintiffs' attorneys of
record."83 The defendants also believed their hours should be excluded based on the
minimal number of hours worked (seven total),84 which the defendants believed were
either "duplicative of work performed by Mr. Schiller and Mr. Yasser or related to
non-compensable matters such as preparation and review of press releases."85 The
defendants pointed to the minimal number of hours as evidence that "their
involvement was not reasonably necessary."86 The defendants likened the time spent
by Ms. Appelbaum and Ms. Brake to the second attorney in Mares v. Credit Bureau
of Raton,87 stating that although their involvement was helpful, it was not essential. 8
The defendants' final argument questioning the reasonableness of the hours
billed was based on the fact that all work was performed by Mr. Schiller and/or Mr.
Yasser themselves.89 The defendants stressed that no work was performed by either
a legal assistant or an associate attorney during the course of the suit.' The
defendants stated that the following tasks were performed by Mr. Schiller, Mr.
Yasser, or both: (1) the writing of every pleading, discovery request and brief; (2)
the drafting of all correspondence; (3) all legal research, all witness interviews and
all trips made to observe the Owasso School District athletic facilities.9' The
defendants questioned the fact that Mr. Schiller and Mr. Yasser filed the pleadings
themselves and indicated such practices are unreasonable in the Northern District of
Oklahoma.92 The defendants claimed they were being penalized by the possibility of
77. See id.
78. See id; see also Yasser Billing Records, supra note 16, at 4,12, 13; Schiller Billing Records, supra note 17,
at 2, 5.
79. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 8.
80. See id. (referencing Brown v. Eichler, 680 F. Supp. 138, 142-143 (D. Del. 1988)); see also Lock v. Jenkins,




84. See Appelbaum Affidavit, supra note 18, at 1-3; Brake Affidavit, supra note 19, at 1-3.
85. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 8.
86. Id.
87. 801 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir. 1986).
88. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 8.
89. See id. at 8-9.
90. See id. at 8.
91. See id. at 8-9.
92. See id. at 9.
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increased attorney's fees in this case because neither a legal assistant nor a lower-
billing associate attorney was used.93
The second component of the lodestar calculation questioned by the defendants
was the inclusion of activities deemed by the defendants as "public relations
activities."94 The defendants felt that time spent conferring with representatives of
the media, drafting and reviewing press releases, and appearing on radio shows was
not time reasonably expended on litigation and should be excluded from the lodestar
calculation.95 The defendants noted nine hours expended on these activities during
the course of the lawsuit.96
The defendants gave some examples in which hours related to public relations
activities were excluded from the final award granted to attorneys. In one decision
following a remand by the Tenth Circuit, "the district court pointed out that 'time
spent attending speeches and press conferences must be deducted since it is not
necessary to the litigation of the case."' 97 The court "disallowed 28 hours sought by
the plaintiffs for time spent attending press conferences, speeches, and meetings.""8
In another case, the district court's decision to disallow attorneys' time spent in
public relations was upheld by the Tenth Circuit.99 The defendants also noted two
instances outside the Tenth Circuit in which attorneys' time on public relations work
was disallowed."°
Based on the generic term "public relations," the defendants sought to disallow
Mr. Schiller's and Mr. Yasser's time spent conferring with media representatives,
drafting and reviewing press releases and appearing on radio and television news
shows. l' The defendants indicated that such time did not help resolve the litigation
and should be excluded from the lodestar calculation. 0 2
The third component of the lodestar contested by the defendants was the hourly
rate charged for Mr. Yasser's and Ms. Appelbaum's services. The defendants
claimed the prevailing market rate for such services in the Northern District of
Oklahoma was $125 per hour instead of the $175 per hour as billed by Mr. Yasser
and Ms. Appelbaum, and therefore the charges for their services should be reduced
by $50 per hour.3
The defendants relied on a Tenth Circuit decision in which the court stated,
"[tihe relevant market value is not the price that the particular lawyer chosen may be
paid by willing purchasers of his or her services, but rather the price that is
93. See id.
94. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 4.
95. See id.
96. See Id.; see also Yasser Billing Records, supra note 16, at 1-15; Schiller Billing Records, supra note 17, at 1.
18.
97. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 4 (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 632 F. Supp. 376,381 (D. Col. 1986)).
98. Id. (quoting Ramos, 632 F. Supp. at 384).
99. See id. at 4-5 (referencing Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995)).
100. See id. at 5 (referencing Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 1994) and Gray v.
Romeo, 709 F. Supp. 325 (D. R.I. 1989)).
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 10-11.
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customarily paid in the community for services like those involved in the case at
hand."' 4 In Beard v. Teska, 05 the "Tenth Circuit was required to determine the
reasonable market rate for legal services in the Northern District of Oklahoma in a
civil rights class action against school districts and the Oklahoma State Department
of Education."" 6 The district court awarded the attorneys' fees based on the hourly
fees those attorneys regularly received.0 7 The Tenth Circuit reversed, and established
the award at the prevailing market rate in the Northern District at that time, which
was $125.'0'
The defendants' contented that, based on Beard, Mr. Yasser and Ms.
Appelbaum were only entitled to a $125 hourly fee.'09 The defendants claimed $125
was still the prevailing rate in Oklahoma at the time of the Owasso litigation,
although there was no information included to support that statement."'
The second major area the defendants contested was the requested fee
enhancement.' The defendants referred to some of the factors mentioned in the
plaintiffs' brief and attempted to demonstrate that these factors were inapplicable in
this case." 2
The defendants began their response by agreeing the Tenth Circuit has
authorized fee enhancements within the circuit." 3 However, they also argued that the
Circuit's opinion is that enhancements should be granted rarely, and that the lodestar
calculation forms "'the presumptively reasonable fee."""'t The defendants also
pointed to the Supreme Court case Blum v. Stenson, 5 in which several factors that
have otherwise been considered to support a fee enhancement were considered to be
part of the lodestar. 6 These factors include "'novelty and complexity of the issues,'
'special skill and experience of counsel,' 'quality of representation,' and 'results
obtained.'"" '7 The defendants thus implied that these factors, outlined by the plaintiffs
as reason to justify an enhancement, should be disregarded completely." 8
Three other factors addressed in the defendants' response were "'undesirability
of the case' . . . preclusion of other employment,"" 2 and contingency of the
104. Id. at 10 (quoting Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942,956 (10th Cir. 1994)).
105. 31 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 1994).
106. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 10 (referencing Beard, 31 F.3d at 946).
107. See id. at 10 (referencing Beard, 31 F.3d at 946).
108. See id. (referencing Beard, 31 F.3d at 958).
109. See id. at ll.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 11-15.
113. See id.at I I (referencing HomewardBound, Inc.v.HissomMem'l Ctr., 963 F.2d 1352,1356 (1 thCir. 1992)
and Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546,557 (10th Cir. 1983)).
114. Id. at 11-12 (quoting Homeward Bound, 963 F.2d at 1355, citing Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens'
Counsel, 478 U.S. 546 (1986)).
115. 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
116. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 12.
117. Id. (quoting Homeward Bound, 963 F.2d at 1355, referencing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984)).
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 12
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attorneys' fee.'2' The defendants took the position that the undesirability of a case
does not justify a fee enhancement because undesirability is no longer associated with
civil rights cases such as the Owasso suit.'22 The defendants stated that "'a bonus for
the social stigma assumed by a lawyer participating in civil rights litigation should
rarely be given.""' Defendants did not explain exactly in what kind of rare case a
stigma and/or undesirability would justify an enhancement. 124 Defendants' counsel
argued that preclusion of employment should not be considered as an enhancement
factor because the attorneys are being compensated at a reasonable rate.125
The defendants addressed contingency by agreeing it can be considered as a
factor to justify fee enhancement, but again, only rarely. 126 They claimed the Tenth
Circuit has taken the position that contingency is appropriate only in "'exceptional
cases." ' 127 An exceptional case is one in which the prevailing parties were not
expected to succeed "either because the law was unsettled or because the outcome of
the litigation was dependent upon resolution of material facts.' 128
The defendants claimed the plaintiffs did not run a real risk of not prevailing. 129
They argued that Title IX law could not be considered "'unsettled"" 3 because the
statute and regulations establish the validity of causes of action under Title IX as well
as the right to a remedy.' 3' The defendants also stated the "outcome of this case did
not hinge upon the determination of any fact dispute."' 32 They argued Owasso knew
it had problems with Title IX compliance and was working to increase the athletic
opportunities available to female students at the time the suit was filed.' 3 The
defendants argued it was fairly certain the plaintiffs would prevail to some extent,
therefore "no contingency enhancement should be awarded."' 34
The defendants also argued against using the "'efficiency"""' and "'excellent
results obtained"" 36 factors to support an enhancement. Owasso claimed the efficient
resolution was not obtained solely through the plaintiffs' efforts, but rather was
attained through the cooperative spirit of Owasso and the plaintiffs in attempting to
resolve the action. '37 Owasso argued the defendants themselves were instrumental in
achieving the efficiency mentioned by the plaintiffs, choosing to resolve the concerns
in a way that would satisfy both sides instead of engaging in a potentially divisive
121. See id.
122. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 12.
123. Id. (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 557-558 (10th Cir. 1983)).
124. See id.
125. See id. (referencing Ramos, 713 F.2d at 558, n. 10).
126. See id. at 12.
127. Id. at 12-13 (quoting Homeward Bound, 963 F.2d at 1360).
128. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 12-13 (referencing Homeward Bound, 963 F.2d at 1360).
129. See id. at 13.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 13.
133. See id.
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legal battle. 38 The defendants called the plaintiffs unreasonable, stating that a
request for a fee enhancement was actually a method of punishment by the plaintiffs,
in spite of the cooperation and compromises offered by the Owasso School District. 1
39
The defendants then listed the accomplishments which had been or would have
been made without the plaintiffs' intervention. They stated the results of the case were
not extraordinary as claimed by the plaintiffs."4 For example, Owasso stated that it
has "sponsored varsity and junior varsity female softball for many years,... 4. so
inclusion of these two levels of softball was not anything new for the school
district.'42 Owasso also claimed the establishment of volleyball at the varsity and
junior varsity levels was not a result of the Title IX litigation, as the school published
its "intention to establish.., a volleyball program prior to... the litigation.'
' 43
Next, Owasso stated that it maintained "specific records regarding the expenditures
of its revenues on athletic programs"'" for several years, even though this became a
specific provision of the Consent Decree.' 45 Owasso argued it always provided
female athletes with equipment and supplies comparable to those of male athletes as
expressly required by Title IX.' Additionally, Owasso claimed that it always
followed the practice of treating "male and female athletes the same with regard to
travel expenses and support,"'47 another Title IX requirement and provision of the
Consent Decree. 148 Finally, Owasso stated that prior to the filing of the Title IX
litigation, it began providing "male and female athletes with equal access to weight
training and conditioning facilities and equipment,"'49 another Consent Decree
requirement. 15'
The defendants admitted the plaintiffs did prevail on some of their concerns and
the school district had made concessions; ' t however, they closed their argument
against a fee enhancement by stating the results obtained were "neither as extensive
nor as dramatic as they have suggested in their application for attorney's fees."' 52
They argued the lodestar calculation was sufficient to cover the attorneys' fees. 53
The defendants also contested the plaintiffs' request that the court consider, in
the Owasso case, there would be additional involvement between the plaintiffs and
the defendants during the implementation of the Consent Decree which would require
138. See id.at 13.
139. See id. at 13-14.




144. Id. at 14.
145. See id.; see also Consent Decree, supra note 3, at 10-11.
146. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 14.
147. Id.
148. See id.; see also Consent Decree, supra note 3, at 11.
149. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 14.
150. See id. at 14; see also Consent Decree supra note 3, at 14.
151. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 14-15.
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additional work by the plaintiffs' attorneys. 154 The defendants construed this request
as an "open-ended... obligation"'55 to pay future attorneys' fees for monitoring
services and classified the request as a way to establish a "perpetual money
machine."' 56
The defendants claimed the Consent Decree did not contemplate continued
involvement by the plaintiffs' attorneys.'57 They referenced the position of
"'Compliance Officer"". and argued the Officer would be responsible for monitoring
the implementation of the Decree. 59 The defendants also referenced the grievance
procedure contained in the Consent Decree and claimed, if there is a question of
default under the Decree, the grievance procedure must be followed before the court
becomes involved."W
The defendants took the position that the process contained in the Consent
Decree and the request made by the plaintiffs' attorneys were completely "at odds" 6 '
with one another.'62 They indicated the Decree did "not call for close monitoring by
the plaintiffs' attorneys under the supervision of the [c]ourt,"' 63 but rather provided
for self-monitoring by the parties themselves with court involvement only if the
parties could not resolve an issue. 64 The defendants indicated the plaintiffs' request
was, in effect, an "attempt to rewrite the terms of the parties' agreement"' 6 and
approving such a request would place an unreasonable obligation on the
defendants. 66
The defendants' final request included a number of exclusions, reductions, and
denials. First, the defendants requested that Ms. Appelbaum's and Ms. Brake's hours
be excluded from the lodestar calculation. 67 They also asked to exclude Mr.
Schiller's and Mr. Yasser's hours expended on public relations activities. 68 The
defendants asked for a reduction in Mr. Schiller's and Mr. Yasser's remaining hours
by 40% due to "extensive and unreasonable duplication of efforts... , lack of
specificity in... time records, and.., unreasonable failure to make use of less
expense alternatives for routine matters."'' 69 The defendants asked that the hourly fee
for all attorneys be set at $125.'70 Finally, the defendants asked that the request for




157. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 15.
158. Id.; see also, Consent Decree, supra note 3, at 15.
159. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 15.
160. See id. at 15; see also Consent Decree, supra note 3, at 17-18.
161. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 15.
162. See id. at 15.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 15-16.
165. Id. at 16.
166. See id.
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IV. OUR RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS
In response to the defendants' arguments, we submitted a reply that rebutted
those arguments and supported the plaintiffs' original request. We pointed out that
the total fees and costs requested were modest given the efficiency with which the
case was prosecuted. Additional detail on the tasks performed was supplied. We
explained why certain hours were included in the lodestar calculation.
We first addressed the issue of unnecessary duplication charged by Owasso,
pointing out that Owasso listed as unnecessary duplication every hour billed by Mr.
Yasser and Mr. Schiller when the two worked on the same task during the same
day.'72 The hours fell into five categories: (1) conferences with plaintiffs; (2)
telephone and personal conferences between Mr. Yasser and Mr. Schiller; (3) legal
research; (4) document writing and (5) conferences with Owasso's counsel. We
addressed these categories seriatim.
In the first category, conferences with plaintiffs, Owasso listed the three
meetings between plaintiffs and their counsel, in which essential facts were gathered,
as examples of unnecessary duplication. 73 These meetings took place December 10,
1995; January 15, 1996 and January 27, 1996. A total of 16.75 attorney hours was
spent in the meetings in order to gather the factual evidence to bring the class action
litigation. We explained that during meetings, Mr. Yasser and Mr. Schiller
individually met with different plaintiffs for "sequestered" conferences on the factual
issues. Using this method allowed us to verify the accuracy of the accounts by
subsequently comparing notes from the meetings.
We also pointed out that for all three of the meetings, Mr. Yasser and Mr.
Schiller had varied hours. 74 This was a result of the attorney who finished his tasks
first "going off the clock" in order to avoid unnecessary fees. We contend that our
decision to hold meetings to verify facts was actually more efficient and far less
duplicative than requiring formal discovery. We noted that by the time the lawsuit
was filed, facts were verified and Owasso's violations of Title IX were manifest
without the need for costly, time-consuming formal discovery.
Owasso also questioned the time spent in the second category, telephone and
personal conferences between Mr. Yasser and Mr. Schiller. 75 We noted that the
25.25 hours Owasso questioned took place over a period of ten and a half months, an
average of less than 35 minutes per week. These strategic, tactical, and analytical
conferences were necessary in order to confer and disseminate information obtained
in meetings with the plaintiffs as well as discuss ongoing litigation matters. We
pointed out the descriptions submitted on the billing statements purposely did not
contain specific details as we were engaged in other Title X litigation with the same
172. See id. at 7; see also Yasser Billing Records, supra note 16, at 1-15; Schiller Billing Records, supra note 17,
at 1-18.
173. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 7.
174. See Yasser Billing Records, supra note 16, at 1-2; Schiller Billing Records, supra note 17, at 1-2.
175. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at7.
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defense counsel. Thus, details of the subject matter were not submitted in order to
preserve the interests of the other clients. We offered to present more specific details
to the court at its pleasure and reiterated that, far from being duplicative, the hours
spent in personal and telephone conferences saved time and promoted efficiency by
regularly reviewing all aspects of the case through brief discussions.
In the third category, Owasso questioned the 6.75 hours spent on legal
research.'76 We were amazed that Owasso challenged such a low figure, since the
hours were minimal at best, a direct result of our expertise in the Title IX area of law.
We explained those hours were spent researching the requirements of Title IX and
class action and were necessary for purposes of drafting the Complaint, Consent
Decree, and Class Action documents. Again, we offered to supply more detailed
information regarding our research to the court upon request.
In the fourth category, potentially duplicative billing, Owasso questioned the
hours spent on document drafting and offered its own opinion on how the drafting
could have taken place. 77 Our response explained the methodology behind the
drafting of the documents in which responsibilities were divided. For example, one
of us drafted the paragraphs dealing with the factual allegations of the Complaint
while the other drafted the legal allegations. One drafted the Motion for Class
Certification and opening twelve pages of the accompanying Brief while the other
drafted the final twelve pages of the Brief. All other documents and pleadings were
similarly assigned. We believed that this division of assignments accomplished the
required tasks in an expeditious manner and demonstrated that Owasso's suggestion
for increased efficiency was without merit or support.
We also pointed out an area in which Owasso was grossly inefficient, not only
with regard to the plaintiffs' fees, but also in relation to Owasso's payment of its own
counsel's fees. On several occasions, in order to increase efficiency and reduce time
and expense, we urged defense counsel to agree to class certification. Each time they
refused. Therefore, we were forced to file a Motion with accompanying Brief for
Class Certification. Defense counsel then filed an extensive Response in Opposition
which we were compelled to review and analyze. Plaintiffs also had to prepare for
a hearing on the matter. Only at the hearing were we made aware of the defense's
agreement to class certification. We pointed out the obvious inefficiency and noted
that Owasso could not point to an instance of such unnecessary work and expense on
our part. We requested that the court review the entire billing record to confirm the
Complaint and the Class Action Certification documents were researched and drafted
into final form for filing with all due attention to efficiency.
In the final category, regarding duplicative billing, Owasso questioned the
appearance of both plaintiffs' counsel at the June 12th Case Management
Conference, the August 13th Status Conference and the September 3rd Settlement
Conference.'78 A total of fourteen and a half hours was spent in these three
176. See id. at8.
177. See id. at7-8.
178. See id. at 7.
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conferences as well as other conferences with defense counsel. We explained that,
due to the method of representation which included segregation of duties, we both
needed to be present. Representation of a class in a complex, fact-intensive case is
a solemn responsibility we took very seriously. In order to effectively represent the
plaintiffs, both of us needed to attend these crucial conferences. Because we were
both present, the conferences were more efficient.
We also countered defense counsel's argument that Mr. Schiller's trip to view
the athletic facilities at the Owasso School District was not reasonable. When the
tour was proposed, all counsel immediately agreed on the appropriateness of the visit.
We were completely mystified by the defense's complaint, since the defense attorney
represented Owasso on the tour. Any other alleged duplication in Owasso's expense
analysis actually involved separate conferences with the same individual(s) on the
same day, with the exception of the conference held on August 21, 1996 to review the
Consent Decree.
We agree with Owasso's position that as the number of attorneys involved
increases, the more likely duplications in billing will occur. However, the majority
of the work was performed by the two lead attorneys with only minimal assistance
from Ms. Appelbaum and Ms. Brake. The defendants claimed the number of hours
alone demonstrated the assistance provided by Ms. Appelbaum and Ms. Brake was
unnecessary. 179 This attack on the hours expended by Ms. Appelbaum and Ms.
Brake was illogical and counter-intuitive, considering we managed to minimize their
involvement by our efforts to keep costs as low as possible.
Owasso's second argument, concerning the calculation of the lodestar, dealt
with hours billed for "public relations" activities. 0 We noted that although the
activities may have been public in nature, the services were necessary as a part of the
litigation and were therefore appropriately included in the lodestar calculation.
Due to the nature of the lawsuit, the plaintiffs had legitimate fears of retribution
from filing the lawsuit. On the day the case was filed, a television reporter telephoned
Mr. Schiller to advise him that a named defendant called her and told her of his plans
to place the girls' names prominently on the school marquee with a statement to the
effect that "these are the girls who sued us." This conversation not only supplied us
with valuable information, but also revealed the hostile attitude and general
recalcitrance faced by the plaintiffs. In spite of the importance of this incident,
Owasso claimed the time spent was not "reasonably expended on the litigation."''
Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits found public relations work compensable.8 2
The Ninth Circuit held that since private attorneys bill their clients for press
conferences and other public relations work, "[p]revailing civil rights plaintiffs may
do the same."'83  We endeavored to educate the defendants, class members and
179. See id. at8.
180. Id. at 4-5.
181. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 5.
182. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 862 F.2d 677, 678 (8th Cir. 1988), affd 491 U.S. 74 (1989); Davis v. City of San
Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir. 1992).
183. Davis, 976 F.2d at 1545.
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community in the belief that education would dispel the hostility faced by the girls.
Since the broadcast and print media actually assisted in this task, our fees for time
spent talking to the press under the circumstances were not only reasonable but also
virtually unavoidable in effectively representing the class.
Finally, the media served as an efficient vehicle to communicate with our class.
As a result of media coverage, we received communication from class members who
relayed factual information to us. This use of the media has been deemed
appropriate. 84 The plaintiffs primarily sought injunctive relief. Unlike many class
actions, such as those in the securities area, the nature of injunctive relief is not
obvious absent contact with many members of the class. 5 In such cases, the news
media can provide "a valuable conduit of information between counsel and the
class."' 18
6
Owasso's final contention regarding the calculation of the lodestar was the
hourly fee billed by Mr. Yasser and Ms. Appelbaum.1 7 Owasso cited Beard in
arguing that $125 per hour was still the prevailing market rate in the Northern
District of Oklahoma.' 88 In Beard, the court relied heavily upon the defendant's
expert, who testified that the $125 hourly rate was based upon a survey of 70 cases
covering the period of 1980 to 1991.189 The cases surveyed were "IDEA-type" cases
(i.e., Individuals with Disabilities Education Act cases).' 90 We argued that the Beard
rate was out-dated and should not be applied to a ground-breaking case of first
impression. The $125 hourly rate awarded in Beard was for services performed
between 1987 and 1990.79" The prevailing rate in the Northern District at the time
of the Owasso Title IX litigation was much higher.
In plaintiffs' application for fees, Mr. Yasser submitted an affidavit from Mr.
Martin A. Frey, Senior Adjunct Settlement Judge in the Northern District, in support
of the reasonableness of his $175 per hour rate. 92 This rate was that "prevailing in
the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably compared skill,
experience and reputation."' 93 Mr. Yasser is the lead co-author of the nation's most
widely used Sports Law Casebook.'94 He was recently named an "Outstanding
Professor," the University of Tulsa's most prestigious teaching award. In a long
career at the University of Tulsa, he continually participates in the active practice of
law. He was one of the original lawyers in perhaps the most noteworthy civil rights
cases in the Northern District, the so-called "Hissom" litigation. He performed the
initial crucial analysis in and supplied his considerable expertise throughout, this
184. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,439 F. Supp. 393 (D.C. Colo. 1977).
185. See id. at 408.
186. See id.
187. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 10-11.
188. See id. at 10 (citing Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 1994)).
189. See Beard, 31 F.3d at 949.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See Martin A. Frey Affidavit at 1-2, Randolph v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. (N.D. Okla. 1996) (No. 96-CV-
0105K).
193. Beard, 351 F.3d at 955.
194. RAYYASSERETAL, SPORTS LAW (3ded. 1997).
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case. Considering Mr. Yasser's skill, experience, and reputation, the $175 per hour
rate requested appeared reasonable in this type of litigation. Similarly, Ms.
Appelbaum's credentials also supported a $175 per hour fee.
Owasso also challenged the proposed fee enhancement. 95 Owasso stated the
fee enhancement was not necessary because the case "did not hinge upon the
determination of any fact dispute"' 96 and "[i]n truth and fact, the Owasso School
District was aware of the need to continue to increase athletic opportunities available
to female students"' 97 when the action was filed. There was a discrepancy between
these statements from Owasso's Brief compared to the blanket denials in Owasso's
Answer. Either the statements in the Brief fundamentally misrepresented the truth or
the Answer denied factual allegations which Owasso knew were true. This was a
revisionist approach to the history of the lawsuit, and our response challenged this
discrepancy in Owasso's position. We noted the Consent Decree contained wording
that was actually proposed by the defense counsel to demonstrate the far-reaching
results of the litigation.'
We rebutted Owasso's argument that it made substantial progress toward Title
IX compliance prior to the filing of the suit. Both the Consent Decree and the facts
patently contradict this position and we provided several examples to support this
assertion. For example, Owasso claimed that prior to the filing of the suit, it initiated
a practice which provided male and female athletes with equal access to both weight
training and conditioning facilities and equipment. Yet, even at the time we submitted
our response, equal access to weight training facilities was not accomplished.
Furthermore, the Consent Decree itself required Owasso to come up with a plan to
achieve sports specific weight training and conditioning facilities and equipment by
a certain time frame.'99 The paragraph regarding the plan, providing benefits to girls
comparable to those offered to boys, was placed in the Consent Decree at Owasso's
request because Owasso insisted it could not implement a plan earlier than the
specified time frame. This confirmed that significant progress with Title IX was
lacking at the time the suit was filed.
The final issue in our response addressed our request for a provision for
monitoring fees. Owasso's attempt to paint the request as a way to turn the case into
a "perpetual money machine! 2  was distasteful and offensive. We requested a
mechanism of compensation for post-Consent Decree fees without having to go
through the attorney fee process again. We suggested that a legal reserve of $5,000
be set aside for compensable legal work required to insure compliance with the
Consent Decree. The court need only become involved should the requested fees be
disputed or in excess of the reserve. Having a reserve would be efficient and cost-
saving for both the court and Owasso, who could avoid defense counsel involvement.
195. See Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 11-15.
196. Id. at 13.
197. Id.
198. See Consent Decree, supra note 3, at 3.
199. See id.
200. Defendants' Brief, supra note 38, at 3.
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V. COURT ORDER
Judge Kern began the Court Order by summarizing the progression of the case
from the commencement of the suit to the issuance of the Consent Decree.2"' First,
the Court Order addressed our request for an enhancement. 0 2 The court stated that
in the Tenth Circuit, enhanced fees are not granted as a matter of course. 23 The
court stated:
[w]e believe that bonuses or multipliers of the normal fee because of the
extraordinary skill of counsel should rarely be awarded, and should be confined
to cases in which the bulk of the work was done by a single attorney who exhibits
extraordinary skill or to cases in which the work was done well in a relatively
short time given the complexity of the task.2'"
The court closed its opening statement regarding the issue of enhanced fees by
declaring this case was not exceptional enough to justify enhancement.20 5
The court focused its explanation for its refusal to grant a fee enhancement on
several factors listed as potential reasons to award an enhancement: unpopularity of
the suit, the contingency fee arrangement, preclusion of employment, novelty and
complexity of issues and results obtained. 2 6 First, the court stated there is no longer
any real stigma associated with civil rights cases, and therefore unpopularity does not
justify a fee enhancement.20 7 The court continued by stating that in spite of the
contingency fee arrangement, an enhancement "is appropriate only in [an]
'exceptional case[],' one in which prior to the litigation, the attorney for the prevailing
party was confronted with a 'real risk of not prevailing.' 20 8 The court went on to say
the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a real risk because Title IX principles are
recognized. 2 9
The court stated that the third factor, the preclusion of employment, is not
looked upon favorably by the Tenth Circuit.2 '0 The court also noted that "'novelty
and complexity of issues' and 'results obtained' ' '21 ' are generally compensated as a
part of the lodestar calculation.21 2 The court stated the plaintiffs received "excellent
representation, '2 3 but determined even so, that representation did not justify an
201. See Court Order at 1-2, Randolph v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. (N.D. Okla. 1996) (No. 96-C-105-K).,
202. See id. at 2.
203. See id.
204. Id. (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546,557 (10th Cir. 1983)).
205. See id.
206. See id. at 2-3.
207. See Court Order, supra note 201, at 2 (citing Ramos, 713 F.2d at 557-58).
208. Id. at 3 (quoting Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Hissom Mem'l Ctr., 963 F.2d 1352, 1360 (10th Cir. 1992)).
209. See id.
210. See id. (referencing Ramos, 713 F.2d at 558 n.10).
211. Id. (quoting Homeward Bound, 963 F.2d at 1355).
212. Id. (citing Homeward Bound, 963 F.2d at 1355).
213. Court Order, supra note 201, at 3.
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enhancement.24 The court concluded its explanation of why it did not grant an
enhancement by stating we may have come out ahead by participating in this
engagement, because we became involved in other similar cases in this and other
jurisdictions.2t
The court next examined the calculation of the lodestar amount.216 It began its
examination with a general overview of the calculation process and the parties'
responsibilities.1 7 The court recognized its discretion in determining the amount of
the fee award.2"' "The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to
an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates."
219
"The benchmark for the award is that the attorney's fee must be reasonable. '20 "The
lodestar figure-reasonable hours times reasonable rate-is the mainstay of the
calculation of a reasonable fee.
' 22
'
It is the plaintiffs' responsibility to prove the reasonableness of its fee
calculation, and the court's responsibility to adjust that calculation should it prove
to be unreasonable.2 Thus, it is the plaintiff's burden to "prove and establish the
reasonableness of each dollar, each hour, above zero.' '21 "The prevailing party must
make a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive,
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." ' 24 Once the calculation is made by the
plaintiff, it is the court's obligation to exclude hours from the calculation if the court
believes they were not reasonable.2' The court has the authority to reduce the hours
to a reasonable figure.226 The court also noted that in calculating the lodestar, a
reasonable rate is required to establish an appropriate fee.227 "[T]he prevailing
"28 229market rate in the relevant community'  is considered a reasonable rate.
The court began its review of the plaintiffs' lodestar calculation by stating the
number of hours expended by Mr. Yasser and the rate requested for his time?30 It
also mentioned the submitted mileage costs." The court noted that Owasso did not
object to the mileage figure, and that "reasonable out-of-pocket expenses normally
charged to clients are recoverable as attorney fees under civil rights and other fee-
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 3-8.
217. See id. at3.
218. See id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,437 (1983)).
219. Court Order, supra note 201, at 3-4 (using in part the language of Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437).
220. Id. at 4 (using in part the language of Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478
U.S. 546,562 (1986)).
221. Id. (using in part the language of Anderson v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 80 F.3d 1500, 1504 (10th
Cir. 1996)).
222. See id.
223. Id. (quoting Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995)).
224. Id. (using in part the language of Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1510).
225. See Court Order, supra note 201, at 4 (citing Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 1996)).
226. See id. (citing Carter v. Sedgwick County, 36 F.3d 952,956 (10th Cir. 1994)).
227. See id.
228. Id. (citing Malloy, 73 F.3d at 1018).
229. See id. (citing Malloy, 73 F.3d at 1018).
230. See id.
231. See Court Order, supra note 201, at 4.
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shifting statutes." 2  The court thus approved the mileage costs as a part of the
lodestar calculation.
The court spent a significant portion of the Order establishing the hourly rate
for Mr. Yasser. It began its explanation by noting that one of the defendants' main
objections was to Mr. Yasser's proposed hourly rate of $175.233 The court explained
that the defendants' reliance on the civil rights' hourly fee of $125 established in
Beard was somewhat misplaced, because "specific factors were at work in the court's
decision [regarding the fee calculation]." 4 These factors included the plaintiff's
counsel's lack of background in the area being litigated as well as uncontradicted
evidence before the court as to the hourly rate in that type of litigation.2 5 Thus, the
court indicated that its decision in the Owasso fee calculation would not be mandated
based on Beard.16
Instead, the court stated a "reasonable hourly rate comports with 'those
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably competent
skill, experience, and reputation."'" 7 The court should establish the rate that would
be paid for comparable attorneys in private firms using the information provided and
its own judgment. 8 A judge may also use personal knowledge in ascertaining the
reasonable market rate. 9 The court stated that based on these criteria, it had "taken
into account the increases in billing rates in the past few years and the [c]ourt's own
knowledge of billing rates in this [particular] community.240
The court commented positively on Mr. Yasser's credentials, although it
questioned the extent of his active participation in Title IX cases. 24 ' The court noted
a recent case in which an hourly fee of $175 was granted to prevailing plaintiff's
counsel.242 It stated that in Saladin v. Turner,243 the attorneys were both specialists
in their field as well as experienced litigators.2' The court declared that although Mr.
Yasser's's expertise was unquestionable, his litigation experience (or possible lack
thereof) did not justify a rate of $175 per hour.245 Therefore, the court decided that
although $125 per hour was an outdated figure, $175 per hour was too high, and
granted Mr. Yasser an hourly rate of $150 per hour.2" (The determination of this
particular amount was not explained. It appears to simply split the difference.) The
232. Id. at 4-5. (citing Pinkham v. Camex, 84 F.3d 292, 294-95 (8th Cir. 1996)).
233. See id. at 5.
234. Id.
235. See id. (citing Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 1994)).
236. See id.
237. Court Order, supra note 201, at 5 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.1 1 (1984)).
238. See id. (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546,555 (10th Cir. 1983)).
239. See id. at 5-6 (citing Metz v. Merrill Lynch, 39 F.3d 1482, 1493(10th Cir. 1994)).
240. Id. at 5.
241. See id. at 6.
242. See id. at 6 (citing Saladin v. Turner, 936 F. Supp. 1571, 1585 (N.D. Okla. 1996)).
243. 936 F. Supp. 1571 (N.D. Okla. 1996).




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 34 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol34/iss1/5
THE FIGHT FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES
court awarded Samuel Schiller his requested fee of $125 per hour without any
discussion.247
Next, the court addressed Owasso's objection to the hours spent on public
relations activities.24 The court determined the hours spent on press interviews and
news releases were not excessive.2 49 The court noted, "[e]nforcement of Title IX
involves vast changes in the structure of a school's athletic programs and is a matter
of public interest within the area."'
The court gave more merit to Owasso's objections regarding duplication of
fees." The court specifically noted two areas: (1) the 79.5 hours spent by Mr.
Schiller and 75.75 hours spent by Mr. Yasser that mirrored one another; and (2) the
12.25 hours spent by Mr. Schiller on drafting and reviewing the Complaint to initiate
the action and the 12 hours spent by Mr. Yasser on the same document. 2 The court
indicated that although this may have been the "first action of its type in Oklahoma,
it [was] surely not the first of its type in the United States,"253 and therefore it was
possible that excessive time was spent on the Complaint. 4 The court also denounced
entries on billing records with descriptions such as "'legal research' and
'conferences,"" stating they were generally not fully compensable." 6 The court
closed its comments on the number of hours by stating some of the work performed
by Mr. Yasser and Mr. Schiller was work clerks or paralegals could perform.7"
The court subsequently found that we were required to spend extra
(unnecessary) time because the defendants initially opposed class action
certification. 8 The court also stated that despite defendants' objections, the visit to
Owasso's facilities was necessary.259 The court then abruptly determined that
although the defendants had requested a reduction in the lodestar hours of 40%, a
better figure would be 20%.260 Unfortunately, the court did not explain why 20%
would be more appropriate, or even why a reduction was justified at all.
Next, the court addressed the issue of Ms. Appelbaum's and Ms. Brake's fees,
although it failed to respond to Owasso's argument in contention of those fees.26' The
court implied the hours were acceptable, but cut Ms. Appelbaum's hourly fee to $150
per hour.262
247. See id.
248. See id. at 6-7.
249. See id. at 7.
250. Court Order, supra note 201, at 7.
251. See id. at 7-8.




256. See Court Order, supra note 201, at 7 (citing HJ. Inc. v. Flygt Corp., 925 F.2d 257,260 (8th Cir. 1991)).





262. See Court Order, supra note 201, at 8.
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The final issue addressed in the Court Order was the monitoring fees.263 The
Tenth Circuit has approved post-judgment monitoring fees;2  however, the court
determined that in this case, the Consent Decree provided a "procedure for assuring
compliance." '265 The court stated that because the parties have the right to resort to
the court if a grievance is not resolved by the established procedure, a special
monitoring fund is unnecessary. 66
VI. CONCLUSION
As of this writing, we have been involved in eight Title IX suits.267 And in each
case, our "fee fight" experience has been similar to what we have reported here.2 68
Attorneys who represent plaintiffs in these types of cases should be prepared to
"hunker down" for a long, and sometimes nasty, struggle. It is as though the
defendant school districts simply cannot accept the stark reality that, under the law,
it is obligatory to pay the attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party. We have
noted an almost complete unwillingness on the part of the school district to make an
even arguably reasonable offer on the issue of the fees.2 69 But "hunkering down" and
patiently fighting for fees is worthwhile. Indeed it is rare for lawyers to have the
opportunity to work for the public good and receive reasonable compensation for their
efforts. We are grateful for the opportunity and are willing to help others who are
interested in joining the battle to achieve gender equity in interscholastic sports.
263. See id.
264. See id. (referencing Joseph A. v. Department of Human Serv., 28 F.3d 1056, 1059 (10th Cir. 1994)).
265. Id.
266. See id. at 8-9.
267. We have been lead counsel inTitle IX suits brought against the following school districts in Oklahoma: Owasso,
Tulsa, Norman, Noble, Guymon, Inola and Sperry. We recently filed a case against the Harrison, Arkansas School
District.
268. The Owasso result is perhaps our least successful. In the other cases decided thus far, we have been awarded
significantly higher percentages of our requested fees. Maybe we have learned by doing. For example, in the Tulsa
case, we received 100% of the billable hours requested.
269. In our Noble case, we actually settled the fees at the settlement conference for 83% ofthe amount we requested.
In no other case have we received an offer to settle fees in excess of 30% of the amount we requested.
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